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Abstract
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) wireless communications have experienced an upsurge of interest
in both military and civilian applications, due to its high mobility, low cost, on-demand deployment, and
inherent line-of-sight (LoS) air-to-ground channels. However, these benefits also make UAV wireless
communication systems vulnerable to malicious eavesdropping attacks. In this article, we aim to examine
the physical layer security issues in UAV systems. In particular, passive and active eavesdroppings are
two primary attacks in UAV systems. We provide an overview on emerging techniques, such as trajectory
design, resource allocation, and cooperative UAVs, to fight against both types of eavesdroppings in
UAV wireless communication systems. Moreover, the applications of non-orthogonal multiple access,
multiple-input and multiple-output, and millimeter wave in UAV systems are also proposed to improve
the system spectral efficiency and to guarantee security simultaneously. Finally, we discuss some
potential research directions and challenges in terms of physical layer security in UAV systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, heterogeneous data applications have emerged in wireless communica-
tions, such as video streaming, e-health monitoring, video conferencing, etc. However, traditional
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2communication networks with fixed infrastructures are unable to meet the increasingly stringent
quality-of-service (QoS) requirements in the fifth-generation (5G) and beyond 5G networks. As a
result, the development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has created a fundamental paradigm
shift in wireless communication systems to facilitate fast and highly flexible deployment of
communication infrastructures. In particular, by exploiting the high maneuverability of UAV,
communication links can be established ubiquitously, especially in temporary hotspots, disaster
areas, and complex terrains. Compared to traditional terrestrial wireless communications, UAV
wireless communications have the following unique features [1]:
• On-demand and swift deployment: UAV enables fast establishment of temporal commu-
nication infrastructures in emergency scenarios where legacy or fixed infrastructures are
destroyed or do not exist, such as disaster rescue, remote sensing, firefighting, and others.
The deployment of UAV facilitates cost-efficient and uninterrupted communications.
• High flexibility: Due to the fully controllable three-dimensional (3D) mobility, UAV can
either stay quasi-stationarily or cruise continuously to a dedicated location, depending on
the requirements of wireless communication systems. The movement of UAVs provides a
new degree of freedom to offer efficient communications.
• High probability of line-of-sight (LoS) air-to-ground channel: According to the field
trial results [2], the LoS component dominates the air-to-ground channels in many practical
scenarios, especially for rural areas or moderately height UAV altitude. This channel charac-
teristic leads to the fact that the channel state information (CSI) can be directly determined
by the position of each node and used to facilitate the design of high-speed communication
systems.
• Limited resources: It is noted that onboard batteries of UAVs have limited energy storage.
Moreover, the sizes of UAVs are usually small for on-demand deployment, and the weights
of UAVs for communications are typically not exceeding 25 kg for both safety and energy
consumption issues [1]. These limitations directly restrict the communication, computation,
and cruising duration capabilities of UAV.
Despite the promising gains brought by UAVs, the open nature of air-to-ground wireless
channels makes secure information transfer a challenging issue. Specifically, on the one hand,
information signals transmitted over wireless LoS channels are likely to be intercepted by some
undesired receivers which leads to a risk of information leakage. On the other hand, wireless UAV
3transceivers are vulnerable to malicious jamming attacks. Hence, security plays an extremely
important role in UAV wireless communications. Unfortunately, traditional encryption techniques
require high computational complexity leading to a large amount of energy consumption [3]
which may not be suitable to UAV systems. As an alternative, physical layer security is compu-
tationally efficient and effective in safeguarding wireless communication networks via exploiting
the inherent randomness of wireless channels. As a result, various physical layer techniques have
been proposed in the literature for guaranteeing communication security, e.g., [3]–[11].
Since the channel characteristics determine the performance of physical layer security, the LoS
channels as well as the mobility and flexibility of UAVs bring both opportunities and challenges
into the physical layer security design in UAV systems. In particular, on the one hand, the
LoS channel condition in UAV-based communication systems may increase the vulnerability to
eavesdropping. On the other hand, the fully controllable mobility of UAVs can be exploited to
enhance communication security via adjusting its trajectory. For example, if the locations of
eavesdroppers are known, the UAV can avoid flying close to them to reduce the potential of
information leakage for guaranteeing secure transmission. Hence, introducing UAV to wireless
communication systems is a double-edged sword which requires a careful system design and
thorough research.
Motivated and inspired by the unique challenges and opportunities brought by UAV, this paper
aims to provide an important overview on physical layer security in UAV wireless communication
systems, which sheds light on potential researches in this field. In particular, the potential
security attacks specifically in UAV wireless communication systems are discussed. Moreover,
corresponding solutions are provided in terms of emerging techniques by considering both the
advantages and limitations of UAV. To further enhance the physical layer security, the applications
of advanced 5G technologies, e.g., NOMA, 3D beamforming, and mmWave, are investigated in
UAV wireless communication systems. Finally, potential research challenges that have not been
addressed in the literature and some future directions in terms of secure communications in UAV
systems are envisioned.
II. SECURITY ATTACKS IN UAV SYSTEMS
A typical physical layer security communication problem comprises a minimum of three nodes,
i.e., a legitimate transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and a potential eavesdropper, which can be
modeled by a wiretap channel [3]. In general, secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability
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Figure 1. Illustrations of security issues in UAV wireless communication systems.
are the two fundamental metrics to evaluate the physical layer security performance. Typically,
denote CM and CE as the Shannon capacities of the main channel and eavesdropping channel,
respectively. Consequently, the secrecy capacity CS is defined by [3]
CS = [CM − CE]+, (1)
where [x]+ , max{x, 0}. Notably, perfectly secure communication between a legitimate pair is
possible, when the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the main channel.
In UAV-based communication systems, a UAV can act as either a transmitter or a receiver.
On the one hand, it is noted that when the UAV is a legitimate transmitter, the associated
air-to-ground LoS channels facilitate the signal reception at both legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, which may increase the vulnerability to potential eavesdropping. On the other
hand, when the UAV acts as a legitimate receiver, the existence of LoS channels enhance the
physical layer security especially against passive eavesdropping. As such, to investigate the
security issues in the presence of eavesdroppers, we mainly focus on the former scenario where
the UAV acts as a legitimate transmitter. The potential security attacks in UAV systems are
illustrated in Figure 1 and will be described in the following sections.
A. Passive Eavesdropping Scenarios
In this scenario, passive eavesdroppers intend to intercept some confidential data without
degrading the received signal quality at the legitimate receiver. Since the eavesdroppers work
5in a passive manner and only intend to intercept the confidential messages, they usually remain
silent and their position information is not easy to be obtained by the UAV, which makes the
system vulnerable to eavesdropping. In the following, we discuss three cases with different
availabilities of the eavesdroppers’ position information.
1) Full Position Information of Eavesdroppers: An optical camera or a synthetic aperture
radar equipped at the UAV can help to detect and track the positions of potential external
eavesdroppers. If the eavesdroppers stay stationary, obtaining the complete positions of these
external eavesdroppers are possible at the UAV. As such, the security issues are likely to be
addressed in such scenarios via proper resource allocation design and taking advantage of the
flexibility of UAV. However, obtaining such precise position information requires a high hardware
cost. Besides, the required new equipments impose an extra load to UAV which may increase
its energy consumption.
2) Partial Position Information of Eavesdroppers: When the eavesdroppers stay quasi-stationary
or move in certain areas, obtaining precise position information of eavesdroppers is challenging
and expensive in terms of hardware cost and energy consumption. Then, with the aid of the
equipped camera or radar on the UAV, partial position information of these eavesdroppers is
possible to be obtained at the UAV via sensing and tracking. In the literature, worst-case secrecy
capacity and secrecy outage probability are the two common metrics to evaluate the performance
of UAV systems with partial position information of external eavesdroppers [3], [7], [8].
3) Absence of Position Information of Eavesdroppers: When eavesdroppers hide themselves
physically, it is difficult for the UAV to detect and track them. This raises a problem that
the completely absence of position information makes the UAV system extremely vulnerable to
eavesdropping. In such scenarios, perfectly secure communications cannot be always guaranteed.
B. Active Eavesdropping Scenarios
Compared to passive eavesdroppings, active ones are more dangerous. The reasons are twofold.
On the one hand, the active eavesdropping intends to attack the main channel by degrading the
channel capacity. For instance, active eavesdroppers transmit jamming signals to the legitimate
receiver for degrading the capacity of the main channel, i.e., CM. On the other hand, the active
eavesdropping may also aim to improve the capacity of the eavesdropping channel. As such,
eavesdropping attacks caused by an active eavesdropper is more harmful than that of passive
ones. Specifically, the LoS channel characteristic can improve the capacity of the eavesdropping
6channel when the UAV is a legitimate transmitter. According to the duplexing mode, we discuss
the following two types of jamming attacks in UAV wireless communication systems:
• Full-duplex (FD) eavesdropper: A FD active eavesdropper transmits jamming noise and
intercepts confidential signals simultaneously and independently [12]. In such scenarios,
the UAV would increase its transmit power to improve the quality of the jammed channel
which not only facilitates the eavesdropping at the FD eavesdropper due to the LoS channel
characteristics, but also consumes more energy to combat the active eavesdroppings.
• Cooperative half-duplex (HD) eavesdroppers: Multiple HD eavesdroppers can mimic a FD
eavesdropper via cooperation. For instance, some eavesdroppers transmit jamming to the
legitimate receiver, while the others intercept the confidential signal.
In both situations, when the CSI of the legitimate receiver is available at the active eavesdrop-
pers, the UAV systems become severely vulnerable, as the active eavesdroppers can efficiently
interfere the legitimate receiver.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR UAV SYSTEMS
To enhance the physical layer security, the unique properties of UAVs, e.g., high mobility
and flexibility in positioning, can be exploited. Moreover, by using advanced resource allocation
techniques, the secrecy performance can be further improved. In the following, we discuss the
specific effective physical layer security strategies against the corresponding eavesdroppers listed
in Section II in air-to-ground channels, as shown in Table I.
A. Anti-Eavesdropping Techniques
1) Joint Trajectory and Resource Allocation Design: In UAV systems, there are various
resources needed to be allocated, such as transmit power, cruising speed, time slot, and frequency
bandwidth. It is noted that resource allocation affects the signal strength received at not only the
legitimate receiver, but also the eavesdroppers. In the following, we first discuss how trajectory
design can be exploited to improve the physical layer security in UAV systems. We then provide
an overview on the joint design of resource allocation and trajectory for physical layer security
provisioning.
a) Trajectory Design Approach: In practice, the initial and final locations of the UAV are
usually predetermined. Besides, the UAV is also constrained by the maximum cruising speed
and duration. These define the maximum service area. As a result, UAV trajectory design has
7TABLE I
SPECIFIC SECURITY ATTACKS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN UAV WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Security attacks
Passive eavesdroppings FD/Cooperative HD active eavesdroppings
Full PI Partial PI Absence of PI Full PI Partial PI Absence of PI
Techniques
Joint design X X X X X X
Robust design X X
Artificial noise X X X X
Multi-UAV CoMP X X X X X X
Technologies
Multi-antenna X X X X X X
NOMA X X
mmWave X X X X X X
PI: Position information
Joint design: Joint trajectory and resource allocation design
become an important research topic for realizing efficient UAV-based communication systems
[4]–[6]. In terms of communication security, the UAV can fly close to the legitimate ground
node and away from the eavesdropper if it is possible. The principle is to carefully design the
trajectory of UAV, such that the legitimate link can be enhanced while the eavesdropping link
becomes weaken.
b) Resource Allocation: Specifically, a joint design of trajectory and resource allocation is
a promising approach to further enhance physical layer security, e.g., [5], [6]. The basic principle
of the joint design is that when a UAV has to fly close to the eavesdropper, the UAV can decrease
or shut down the transmission power to reduce the potential of information leakage. At the same
time, the UAV flies away from the eavesdropper with its full speed for saving more time slots
for the future. In contrast, when the UAV flies close to the legitimate receiver, the UAV usually
slows down and increases its transmit power for the confidential information transmission.
We provide an example to show how UAV can be adopted as a mobile relay to guarantee
secure communications via joint trajectory and resource allocation design. In the considered
scenario, a legitimate transmitter intends to serve a legitimate receiver in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper with the aid of a UAV. The UAV is introduced as a mobile relay to complete the
data delivery and to enable physical layer security. The ultimate goal of the system design is to
maximize the spectral efficiency of the system, while guaranteeing secure communications and
subject to certain practical constraints as in [6]. The joint trajectory and resource allocation design
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Figure 2. The optimized UAV trajectories for the eavesdropper moves anticlockwise (a) and clockwise (b) around the legitimate
receiver with radius 1 km. The achieved system rate (c) and the corresponding cruising speed (d) via joint trajectory and resource
allocation design to enhance the physical layer security in UAV-aided wireless communication scenarios.
can be obtained by iteratively solving the corresponding approximated optimization problem.
Figure 2 provides some interesting insights into the trajectory and transmission performance
during the operation period. In this figure, the legitimate transmitter and its receiver locate at
(0, 0, 0) and (5 km, 0, 0), respectively, in a 3D Cartesian coordinate system. The position of
the eavesdropper is assumed to be available at the UAV for the optimal design. The maximum
cruising speed of the UAV is 20 km/h.
Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) depict the optimized trajectories of a UAV for two interesting
scenarios, where the eavesdropper dynamically moves anticlockwise and clockwise, respectively,
around the legitimate receiver with radius 1 km and velocity 50 km/h. Variables st, sr, and se rep-
resent locations of the legitimate transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eavesdropper, respectively.
q0 and qN represent the predetermined initial and final locations of UAV, respectively. From
this figure, we find that the UAV first flies close to the transmitter for caching enough data.
Then it approaches the legitimate receiver and avoids any possible trajectories leading close
to the eavesdropper. Figure 2(c) and Figure 2(d) depict the capacities and the corresponding
cruising speed of the UAV, respectively, via the optimal joint design. In these two figures, the
eavesdropper locates stationary at (4 km, 0, 0). CU denotes the instantaneous achievable rate
at the UAV. From Figure 2(c) and Figure 2(d), we find that when the UAV locates closer to
the eavesdropper than to the legitimate receiver, the UAV either caches data from the legitimate
9transmitter by slowing down and then hovering above it or keeps silent and moves away from the
eavesdropper. Differently, when the UAV is closer to the legitimate receiver, the UAV transmits
confidential signal with a positive secrecy rate and tries to hover above the desired receiver
as long as possible. These indicate that joint trajectory and resource allocation design in UAV
systems is an effective way to enhance the physical layer security and improve spectral efficiency.
2) Robust Joint Design: When only partial or statistical position information of eavesdroppers
is available, robust joint design can be exploited to facilitate secure UAV communications by
considering the worst case scenario. For example, the uncertain location area of the potential
eavesdropper can be modeled by a region with a center which is the exact location of the
eavesdropper where the length of its radius is related to the amount of uncertainty. Then, the
robust design for the worst-case communication security is to guarantee the QoS of the system
whenever the eavesdropper is located within the region. In general, the UAV with optimized
trajectory would fly as close as possible to the legitimate receiver for enhancing the capacity
of the legitimate channel while cruises away from the uncertain area of the eavesdropper(s) as
much as possible. Also, a higher transmit power from the UAV is adopted when the UAV is
close to the legitimate user to exploit the short distance communication between the transceivers.
However, when the UAV has to approach the uncertain area of the eavesdropper(s), it decreases
or shuts down the transmit power and accelerates away from this area to reduce the potential of
information leakage.
3) Artificial Noise: To address the security issues caused by passive eavesdroppers with the
absence of their position information, one effective approach is to transmit artificial noise to the
null space of the legitimate pair’s channels via performing cooperation among multiple UAVs and
to transmit confidential data only when UAVs are close enough to the legitimate receiver via joint
trajectory and resource allocation design. To this end, confidential data and artificial noise are
available among the cooperating UAVs. As such, the capacity of the confidential signal through
the legitimate channel, i.e., CM in Eq. (1), is increased but that through the eavesdropping channel,
i.e., CE, is reduced. However, since artificial noise consumes some transmit power, this would
leave a smaller amount of system power for allocating to the confidential information signal.
Therefore, power allocation is an important issue in UAV-based wireless communications for
improving the system secrecy capacity. However, finding the optimal power allocation for UAV-
based typically means solving non-trivial NP-hard optimization problems which are generally
intractable. Hence, computationally efficient suboptimal solutions should be proposed.
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B. Anti-Jamming Techniques
To address the security issues caused by jamming attacks, cooperation among multiple UAVs
[9] can be exploited to enhance the physical layer security, since when multiple UAVs are
available, cf. Figure 1, the degrees of freedom for optimizing the system resources are increased.
The cooperation approaches can be summarized into the following two cases.
For instance, cooperative multi-point (CoMP) transmission technique can be employed at
UAVs. In particular, these multiple UAVs can form a virtual antenna-array to enhance the received
signal strength at legitimate receivers while degrade that at the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, with
multiple UAVs in the system, one can optimize their trajectories and resource allocations such that
some UAVs transmit confidential signal to the ground legitimate receivers while the others send
jamming signals to confuse the eavesdroppers. According to the availabilities of eavesdroppers’
positions, UAV can adopt different transmission schemes against active eavesdroppings:
• When UAVs have the complete position information of the eavesdroppers, multiple UAVs
can be employed to facilitate a joint trajectory and resource allocation design via forming
a virtual antenna-array. Consequently, the confidential signal transmission can be enhanced
by focusing the information energy beams to the ground legitimate receiver while reducing
the possibility of information leakage.
• When UAVs have only partial position or statistical information of the eavesdropper, robust
joint trajectory and resource allocation design can be introduced into multi-UAV networks
to improve the secrecy rate of the system or to reduce the secrecy outage probability below
a certain level [7].
• When the position information of the active eavesdropper is completely absent at UAVs,
multi-UAV applying cooperative jamming to the orthogonal space of the legitimate receiver’s
channel and position adjustment are effective methods to degrade the received signals at
eavesdroppers and enhance that at the legitimate receiver [8]. Moreover, multi-antenna
techniques can be adopted to utilize spatial degrees of freedom, hence enhance the quality
of the received signal at the legitimate receiver, and reduce the potential information leakage
to active eavesdroppers via precise beamformer design. Furthermore, one can exploit the
huge bandwidth of mmWave frequency band to avoid potential eavesdropping and take
advantages of line-of-sight dominated channels in mmWave systems for realizing highly
directional transmission.
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Figure 3. (a): The rate region achieved by NOMA and OMA with different maximum cruising durations. (b): The accumulated
data for the internal eavesdropper versus its displacement with different accumulated confidential data rate targets.
Remark: We note that the the aforementioned anti-jamming techniques can be also adopted
to reduce information leakage against passive eavesdroppings. Besides, the techniques used for
addressing security issues in air-to-ground channels can be also applied to ground-to-air ones
where the UAV is a legitimate receiver. For instance, the flexibility of the UAV can be lever-
aged against eavesdropping and jamming attacks via proper trajectory planning or cooperative
receiving.
IV. ADVANCED APPROACHES FOR UAV SYSTEMS
To further enhance the system secrecy performance, some advanced techniques can also be
incorporated into the UAV systems [11], [13]. In the sequel, we will discuss the potential
applications of NOMA, beamforming, and mmWave techniques in UAV systems for improving
the performance of physical layer security.
A. Enhancing Physical Layer Security by NOMA
NOMA is viewed as a promising technique to provide superior spectral efficiency by mul-
tiplexing information signals at different power levels [13]. Hence, it is expected that NOMA
can bring additional rate and robustness to enhance the achievable rate in UAV physical layer
security communications. Consider a scenario where a UAV acts as a relay to facilitate data
delivery to two receivers with different security clearance levels within a maximum cruising
duration T . The receiver with a lower security clearance level is a potential eavesdropper
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since it has a strong motivation in intercepting signals intended to a receiver with a higher
security clearance. Then, when the eavesdropper suffers from a bad channel condition, NOMA
is adopted to forward both confidential and public information simultaneously. Otherwise, UAV
only broadcasts the public information for security issues. The mode selection between NOMA
and unicast is chosen based on the results of the proposed resource allocation optimization. In
particular, for maximizing the spectral efficiency, one needs to jointly optimize the transmission
scheme, resource allocation, and UAV’s trajectory. However, the coupled optimization variables
generally result in non-convex optimization problems which are difficult to solve optimally. As
an alternative, an iterative suboptimal algorithm based on successive convex approximation can
be employed to facilitate a computationally efficient joint design [6].
Under the aforementioned optimization framework, Figure 3(a) depicts the optimal rate region
achieved by NOMA and OMA, respectively, with different cruising durations. Figure 3(b) depicts
the maximum accumulated public data rate achieved at the eavesdropper versus the horizontal
displacement of the eavesdropper from the legitimate receiver. From Figure 3, we find that
NOMA scheme always outperforms OMA in all the considered scenarios, which demonstrates
the spectral efficiency advantage brought by NOMA in striking a balance between public data
rate and confidential data rate. Moreover, based on Figure 3(b), we find that the accumulated
rate drops rapidly when the eavesdropper is sufficiently close to the legitimate receiver. In fact,
when the secrecy rate requirement cannot be satisfied, we set the accumulated public data rate
as zero to account for the penalty of the failure in guaranteeing secure communications.
B. Enhancing Physical Layer Security by Multi-antenna Technology
Multi-antenna technologies have been widely considered in wireless communications due to
spatial degrees of freedom for achieving high spectral efficiency [13]. Recently, in order to
concurrently improve the received signal power at the legitimate receiver and degrade the signal
strength received at eavesdroppers, multi-antenna technologies have also been investigated from
the physical layer security aspect to enhance the secrecy performance and robustness of the
system. In speak of the UAV wireless communication systems, the applications of multi-antenna
technology can be realized from the following two approaches, cf. Figure 4.
1) Traditional Two-Dimensional (2D) Beamforming: The traditional 2D beamforming is an
effective way to improve the physical layer security. For example, when the UAV has the
complete knowledge of the CSI, the beamforming direction can be simply set pointing towards
13
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Figure 4. Illustration of the multi-antenna beamforming technique for enhancing physical layer security.
the orthogonal space of eavesdropper’s channel and hence the information can be safely conveyed.
However, it is obvious that this approach may not achieve the best secrecy performance of the
system as the degrees of freedom are not fully utilized to improve the received signal powers
at the legitimate users. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between improving the received signal
strength of the legitimate users and degrading the signal qualities of the eavesdroppers.
2) Three-Dimensional (3D) Beamforming: Compared to the traditional 2D beamforming, 3D
beamforming can generate separated beams in the 3D space simultaneously to provide a better
service coverage [14]. Thus the 3D beamforming yields a higher system throughput and can
support more legitimate users than that of the 2D beamforming. Generally, the 3D beamforming
technique is more suitable for scenarios where the users are distributed in 3D space with
different elevation angles to their transmitter. Due to the high altitude of UAVs, the legitimate
receivers and the potential eavesdroppers can be easily separated by their different altitudes
and elevation angles to the UAVs. Furthermore, LoS channel characteristic in UAV systems
enables effective beamforming in both azimuth and elevation domains. Specifically, narrow and
precise beamformer can be created to improve the transmission efficiency with respect to the
desired legitimate receivers while reduces the possibilities of information leakage to the potential
eavesdroppers.
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C. Enhancing Physical Layer Security by mmWave
mmWave communications have been widely studied in the literature [13], since they are able to
support high data rate by utilizing the abundant frequency bands. One of the major challenges for
mmWave communications is that its performance depends on the availability of LoS channels.
Thus, compared to the conventional terrestrial communications, the inherent LoS channels in
UAV systems facilitate the use of mmWave for high-data rate communications.
As demonstrated in [13], the mmWave channels in UAV systems are very sparse in the angular
domain, as there are generally not many scatters around UAVs in the sky. Hence, one can take
advantages of the specific channel characteristics in mmWave UAV systems for realizing highly
directional transmission and exploit the huge bandwidth of mmWave frequency spectrum to
avoid potential eavesdropping. For instance, active eavesdropping attacks in UAV systems can
be addressed by adopting frequency hopping (FH) technique to hide confidential data over an
ultra-wide mmWave frequency spectrum. There are two main advantages of this technique. First,
confidential data can be hided from the eavesdropper by frequently hopping to different carrier
frequencies without exploiting the CSI. Second, frequency diversity can be exploited in FH to
improve the robustness against jamming active attacks.
V. OPEN ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
UAV-based wireless communications is a growing research area and handling the associated
security issues is the key to unlock its potential. Despite the fruitful research in this area, there
are variety of challenges to be tackled, as shown in Figure 5. In this section, we provide and
list several open issues and challenges for future works.
A. Practical UAV Channel Modeling and Position Acquisition
In the literature, air-to-ground channel is generally modeled by the LoS channel. However,
this model may not be accurate for some scenarios, such as urban areas. Consequently, more
efforts should be devoted to realistic channel modelings and to be verified by practice field test
measurements. Moreover, the mobility of UAV has significant impacts on the CSI acquisition
for both the legitimate users and eavesdroppers. This brings challenges from the physical layer
security perspective, as efficient CSI acquisition algorithms usually exploit the physical properties
of the wireless channels. Therefore, it is necessary to design a pragmatic CSI acquisition
mechanism to detect and track positions of the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers.
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Figure 5. Illustration of security challenges in UAV wireless communications.
B. Physical Layer Security Against Pilot Contamination Attacks
In practice, efficient beamforming for secure UAV communications requires accurate CSI
which can be obtained by exploiting the pilot signals. However, in some scenario, active eaves-
droppers intentionally transmit deterministic pilot samples which are identical to that transmitted
by the legitimate transmitter to deceive the UAV for facilitating eavesdroppings [15]. As a result,
the UAV designs an inappropriate transmission strategy which benefits the signal reception at
the eavesdroppers. For example, the UAV may misjudge the actual network environment and
fly close to the eavesdropper for confidential data delivery which increases the possibility of
information leakage. Hence, investigating some efficient policies to eliminate the impact of pilot
contamination attack is challenging but important for safeguarding UAV systems.
C. Physical Layer Security Against Malicious UAV Attacks
The high mobility and flexibility of UAVs can be exploited not only to enhance physical
layer security, but also to intercept the confidential data and even perform jamming to reduce
the quality of the legitimate link, which may bring more challenges than handling conventional
terrestrial eavesdroppers for safeguarding UAV systems. However, only limited researches have
been devoted in this important aspect from communication theory perspective. Therefore, it is
desired to investigate advanced techniques in terms of the physical layer security to protect
against malicious UAVs.
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D. Optimal Joint Trajectory and Resource Allocation Design
Compare to terrestrial systems, the UAV-based system brings a new dimension to enhance
physical layer security via designing the trajectory of a UAV. However, the designs of trajectory
and resource allocation are generally coupled together, which would make the design optimization
problem intractable. Consequently, most of existing designs are suboptimal. Unfortunately, the
performance gaps between the optimal solution and existing suboptimal solutions are unclear.
Therefore, to improve the performance of physical layer security in UAV systems for mission
critical applications, efficient algorithms are desired to strike a balance between computational
complexity and system performance.
E. Limited Onboard Resources
One critical obstacle in UAV wireless communication systems arises from the restricted flight
duration, limited onboard energy and computational capability, etc, as the battery capacities,
sizes, and weights of UAVs are all limited. As such, investigating advanced techniques to
enable sustainable secure UAV communication are desired. For example, energy harvesting from
solar and laser provides a viable solution to supply energy to UAVs on-the-fly. Besides, UAV
cooperation can effectively leverage the onboard resources among all the cooperative UAVs to
enable secure communication.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provides an overview and comprehensive discussions on the specific security issues
in UAV systems. Challenges and opportunities brought by UAVs for safeguarding UAV-based
communication systems via physical layer security are fully exploited. First, key problems in
terms of security attacks are revealed. Then, physical layer security approaches in UAV systems
are proposed to effectively prevent from both passive and active eavesdroppings. Particularly, we
provide an illustrative example on guaranteeing security provisioning by jointly designing UAV’s
trajectory and resource allocation, which demonstrates the advantages brought by the flexibility
of UAVs. Moreover, we propose to apply NOMA, MIMO, and mmWave techniques in UAV
systems to further enhance the physical layer security and the spectral efficiency. Finally, some
potential research directions and challenges are envisioned.
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